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Abstract 
Sufferers of primary chronic pain syndrome are not currently entitled to 
cover from New Zealand's Accident Compensation scheme. The Supreme 
Court decision in Allenby v H, which adopted a wider interpretation of the 
term "physical injury", presents an opportunity for the courts to reconsider 
whether chronic pain syndrome should constitute an injury. Policy factors, 
particularly the need to uphold the integrity of the legislation enacted by 
Parliament, demand that the status quo exclusion of chronic pain syndrome 
is maintained. A legislative amendment which clarifies this position is 
recommended. 
Keywords 
Accident compensation; chronic pain syndrome; Allenby v H; Teen v ACC. 
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I Introduction 
Everyone has experienced feeling pain. Despite its universality, pain is not 
well understood. It is typically thought of as the body's automatic response 
to tissue injury – it has an identifiable origin, its intensity reflects the extent 
of that injury and it ebbs with time.
1
 However, this common conception 
only reflects one category of pain: acute pain. The other category, chronic 
pain, is less widely known and afflicts sufferers for a prolonged period of 
time. Chronic pain syndrome (CPS) is a poorly understood medical 
condition in which pain signals in a person's central nervous system are 
active, making the sufferer feel pain, when they should be inactive. 
The focus of this paper is whether sufferers of primary CPS should be 
entitled to cover from New Zealand’s Accident Compensation scheme 
(ACC),2  particularly in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Allenby v H (Allenby). While courts have held that CPS itself does not 
constitute a physical injury under the scheme, Allenby offers a new 
precedent on the meaning of physical injury and therefore presents an 
opportunity for the courts to reconsider the current exclusion of CPS. Policy 
factors point away from extending cover to sufferers of CPS and demand 
that the status quo is maintained. A legislative amendment which clarifies 
the existing position is recommended. 
II Present Coverage of Chronic Pain Syndrome  
A Overview of Chronic Pain Syndrome 
The nervous system of CPS sufferers incorrectly sends active pain signals 
when they should be inactive. This incorrect signalling can occur after an 
injury where the pain is post-traumatic but persists long after the injury has 
healed. In other cases, the focus of this paper, pain is primary rather than 
following trauma and is experienced despite there being no apparent 
triggering injury. For these sufferers, there has been no tissue damage like a 
cut or broken bone to explain why they feel pain.   
                                                            
1 Michael S Finch "Law and the Problem of Pain" (2005) 2 U Cin L Rev 285 at 285. 
2 Currently represented by the Accident Compensation Act 2001.  
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The case of Barbara Teen provides an example of primary CPS.3 Ms Teen 
was employed by Telecom as a Credit Service Representative, a job which 
involved telephone use and considerable data entry using a computer 
keyboard. The environment was highly stressful with commercially driven 
attitudes, continued monitoring of performance and few opportunities for 
muscle relaxation and changes of position. After seven months of work she 
experienced pain in her neck, shoulder, back and arms; this was diagnosed 
as occupational overuse syndrome caused by her work as a computer 
operator, later classified as CPS, regional pain syndrome or fibromyalgia.4  
Although she continued working for a period Ms Teen was later deemed 
unfit to work so began receiving weekly ACC compensation.  
Ms Teen’s condition is an example of primary CPS, one of two broad 
categories of CPS. It is accepted that cover may be provided for the other 
category, post-traumatic CPS, where the pain syndrome is the consequence 
of or a progression from a discrete personal injury for which ACC cover is 
available.
5
  The focus of this paper is "an entirely separate and distinct 
question" of entitlement where CPS is labelled primary because it arises 
spontaneously and is not consequential on an antecedent personal injury, as 
was the case with Ms Teen.6 Claimants in these situations often argue that 
their CPS is work-related and caused by repetitive movement in 
unsatisfactory working environments with poor ergonomics.  
Fibromyalgia is an example of a chronic pain condition where pain is felt in 
several parts of the body and is not typically preceded by tissue injury. 7 The 
                                                            
3 Teen v Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation [1999] NZACC 
335. 
4 These terms were used interchangeably. In the past, cases of work-related CPS were 
frequently diagnosed as occupational overuse syndrome (OOS). OOS is a collective term 
for various conditions characterised by discomfort or persistent pain in muscles, joints and 
soft tissue. As OOS is a generic term a more precise diagnosis is now required by ACC, see 
Redshaw v Accident Compensation Corporation [2003] NZACC 61 at [9]. 
5 Teen v Accident Compensation Corporation [2002] NZACC 244 at [36]. Cover was 
therefore available in the following cases, among others: Thirring v Accident Compensation 
Corporation [2008] NZACC 135; Stevens v Accident Compensation Corporation [2008] 
NZACC 167; Watson v Accident Compensation Corporation [2005] NZACC 187; and 
Porima v Accident Compensation Corporation [2012] NZACC 9. 
6 Teen, above n 5, at [21]. 
7 Richard J Wurtman "Fibromyalgia and the complex regional pain syndrome: similarities 
in pathophysiology and treatment" (2010) 59 Metabolism 37 at 37. 
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pain varies in intensity and is sometimes associated with sensations of 
crawling, numbness, or burning even though there is neither inflammation 
nor damage to the nervous system.8 Many sufferers have other symptoms 
like fatigue, depression, anxiety and difficulty concentrating.
9
 The 
prevalence of fibromyalgia in New Zealand was estimated at 1.1 per cent in 
Maori and 1.5 per cent in New Zealand European.10 Women are affected 
more frequently than men.
11
 
It is useful to distinguish between the causes of CPS on the one hand and, 
on the other, the physiological mechanisms or bodily changes which take 
place when a person has CPS. This distinction was explained in Teen v 
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation (Teen): 
"There is no doubt that chronic pain is experienced on the basis of very real 
cellular, biochemical and function changes in the central and peripheral 
nervous system.  However, these physical changes do not imply any specific 
origin."12 A great deal of controversy exists over the condition's causes, 
whereas the bodily changes which take place are reasonably well 
understood.13 
The range of possible causes is illustrated in the evidence provided by 
medical experts in Teen. While one specialist contended that workers in 
monotonous, repetitive jobs are predisposed to CPS,14 another specialist said 
that it has never been established that physical factors at work cause the 
condition.15 Genetic susceptibility, emotional factors, a lack of fitness and 
being self-driven and over-conscientious were considered possible 
                                                            
8 At 37.  
9 At 37. 
10 Patrick Klemp, Sheila M Williams and Shelley A Stansfield "Fibromyalgia in Maori and 
European New Zealanders" (2002) 5 International Journal of Rheumatic Diseases 1 at 2.  
11 Wurtman, above n 7, at 37.  
12 Teen, above n 3, at 13. 
13 In comparison, medical experts accept that the existence of a discrete injury can cause 
secondary or post-traumatic CPS. See for example Thirring v Accident Compensation 
Corporation [2008] NZACC 135 at [25] and [32]. 
14 Teen, above n 5, at [6]. 
15 At [6]. 
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contributing factors.16 The specialists agreed that there is a heavy 
psychological component in the creation and continuation of the condition.17 
In contrast, there is greater understanding of bodily changes which occur 
when a person has CPS. There is a consensus that the condition involves 
physiological changes or changes in the way bodily processes function.18 
These changes take place in the pain processing of the central nervous 
system and mean that nerve fibres respond abnormally, incorrectly sending 
pain signals to the brain, when non-painful signals should be sent.19  
B Legislative History and Relevant Provisions 
This section outlines the legislative history of accident compensation 
legislation in New Zealand with an emphasis on the provisions most 
relevant to CPS cases. 
The Royal Commission of Inquiry chaired by Sir Owen Woodhouse 
proposed in its report (the Woodhouse Report) that the existing worker’s 
compensation and common law system be replaced by a comprehensive, no-
fault compensation scheme. Early versions of the scheme contained broad 
definitions. Under the Accident Compensation Act 1972 a personal injury 
by accident included "incapacity resulting from an occupational disease or 
industrial deafness…" as prescribed in the Act.20  
The Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (the 
1992 Act) sought to create certainty around the scheme's boundaries and, by 
introducing more precise definitions, limit judges' ability to interpret the 
statute expansively.21 The 1992 Act separated the definition of personal 
injury from the causes of that injury, creating two separate requirements.  
                                                            
16 At [6]. 
17 At [26]. 
18 Teen, above n 3, at 13. 
19 Teen, above n 5, at [6].  
20 Accident Compensation Act 1972, s 2(1). This definition was retained in the Accident 
Compensation Act 1982, s 2(1). 
21 Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (5th ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2009) at 28. 
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First, a claimant must show the existence of a personal injury. The 1992 Act 
defined personal injury as the "death of, or physical injuries, to a person, 
and any mental injury suffered by that person which is an outcome of those 
physical injuries to that person".
22
 "Strain" and "sprain" were added as 
statutory examples of physical injury in 1998,23 an addition which was 
retained in the Accident Compensation Act 2001 (the 2001 Act).24 Apart 
from these two examples, no further definition of physical injury is 
provided. 
The second requirement is that the personal injury suffered was caused in 
one of the situations outlined in the statute. ACC generally excludes gradual 
process, disease or infection from cover; the exceptions to this are where the 
condition is work-related, caused by treatment or follows from a discrete 
personal injury.
25
 CPS is a gradual process condition which arises over time, 
so CPS sufferers are excluded from cover unless their condition was caused 
by one of the aforementioned exceptions.26 As gradual process conditions 
caused by accident are not included on the list of exceptions, a claimant 
would not be covered if they argued that an accident caused their primary 
CPS.27 Consequently CPS sufferers typically argue that the condition is 
work-related. For example, substantial amounts of ironing in the home 
could demand repetitive strained movements leading to CPS. As the 
claimant could not argue that their condition was work-related they would 
fall within the general exclusion of gradual process injuries and would not 
be covered by ACC.  
The 1992 Act restricted the scope of cover by introducing a strict three-
stage test to determine whether a gradual process, disease or infection is 
                                                            
22 Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992, s 4(1). 
23 Accident Insurance Act 1998, s 29. 
24 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 26(1)(b). The title of this Act was previously the 
Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001. 
25 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 26(2). 
26 CPS is not typically classified as a disease; see for example Finch, above n 1, at 296; and 
Joel Everest "Fibromyalgia and Worker’s Compensation: Controversy, Problems and 
Injustice" (2009) 60 Ala L Rev 1031 at 1032. The distinction is not material for the 
purposes of ACC cover. 
27 As outlined above, a claimant could be entitled to ACC cover if an accident caused a 
covered antecedent injury which progressed into secondary CPS. This issue is outside the 
scope of this essay.  
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work-related.28 The 2001 Act contains largely the same wording. The 
personal injury must be caused by a gradual process, disease or infection 
and caused in the circumstances outlined in s 30(2).29 In summary, these 
circumstances are that a claimant's workplace or employment task has a 
particular characteristic which contributes to their injury, is not materially 
found in their non-employment activities, and the risk of suffering the injury 
is significantly greater for persons in that workplace or performing that task 
than for others.30 
C History of Entitlement for Chronic Pain Syndrome 
This section charts the history of court decisions concerning primary CPS to 
show the development of the current position in which cover is denied. The 
earliest case on primary CPS of which the author is aware arose under the 
1982 Act. The claimant's CPS was considered a disease which had arisen 
out of her employment. Her disease was therefore able to be covered "in the 
same way" as an injury and the absence of a physical injury did not prevent 
her from receiving ACC entitlement.
31
  
Most cases of primary CPS have come under the 1992 Act and its 
successors. Proving entitlement under this legislation is harder as there are 
two separate requirements a claimant must show: the existence of a personal 
injury and that it satisfies the test of a work-related gradual process, disease 
or infection. This section deals with the court’s approach to the first of these 
requirements. 
The position established by the leading case of Teen, the facts of which are 
described above, is that CPS itself does not constitute a physical injury 
under the scheme. ACC terminated Ms Teen's cover after specialist 
physicians advised that she did not suffer a physical injury and that her 
condition was not work-related. She appealed the decision and her cover 
was initially re-instated after Judge Middleton held that her CPS constituted 
                                                            
28 Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992, s 7. 
29 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 30(1).  
30 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 30(2). 
31 McCulloch v Accident Compensation Corporation [2005] NZACC 109 at [5] and [19]. 
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a physical injury and was suffered as a result of workplace ergonomics.32 He 
highlighted the acceptance from all specialists who gave evidence that CPS 
entailed physiological changes.33 He also made the finding that the 
claimant's cell structure was damaged; this is a surprising conclusion given 
that the specialists emphasised the absence of tissue damage.34 
The same conclusion was reached by Judge Beattie in the similar case 
Waitemata Health Ltd v Ace Insurance Ltd (Waitemata). Rather than finding 
any cell damage, his Honour – more consistently with the medical evidence 
presented – concluded that the plaintiff's CPS "involve[s] physical changes 
and from the perspective of the person concerned it is a change which is 
harmful as it is a change which is causing pain".35 CPS therefore constituted 
a physical injury despite the absence of bodily damage.36 
Six months after his decision in Waitemata, Judge Beattie came to the 
opposite conclusion on a rehearing of Teen.37 The definition of physical 
injury under the scheme, Judge Beattie held, is:38 
…in accordance with the dictionary meaning "of or relating to the 
body as distinguished from the mind or spirit". Using the definition 
of physical injury in line with the natural and ordinary meaning it 
must therefore involve physical damage or hurt, that is bodily 
harm or damage.  
The absence of any damage to the nervous system meant that, on the above 
definition, CPS itself did not constitute a physical injury. As Ms Teen could 
point to no other discrete injury, Judge Beattie concluded that her cover was 
                                                            
32 Teen, above n 3, at 14. 
33 At 13. 
34 At 13. 
35 Waitemata Health Ltd v Ace Insurance Ltd [2002] NZACC 68 at [47]. 
36 At [48]. 
37 Judge Middleton's original decision in Teen (along with two similar decisions) was 
quashed on a procedural point by the High Court and a rehearing ordered in Accident 
Compensation Corporation v McCulloch [2001] NZAR 897 (HC). 
38 Teen, above n 5, at [13]. Judge Beattie repeated this definition in Jones v Accident 
Compensation Corporation [2002] NZACC 242 at [15], an analogous decision released on 
the same day at Teen. 
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correctly revoked.39 This approach was upheld in the High Court where 
Wild J quoted the above definition and refused special leave to appeal.40 
The decision has been referred to with approval in a number of analogous 
cases.
41
 Until this interpretation of physical injury was reassessed in 
Allenby, the accepted interpretation of physical injury therefore required 
damage to the anatomy; bodily change accompanied by pain was 
insufficient. A 'Glossary of ACC terms' affirms that there is no physical 
injury "unless there is evidence of actual damage to the body".42 However, 
there are many critics of the position towards CPS who believe that "a more 
principled solution needs to be found to the plight of these people".
43
 The 
following two sections assess the feasibility of a claimant re-litigating the 
exclusion of CPS under the scheme. This reassessment requires 
consideration of the new precedent relevant to the issue, which is discussed 
in section III; and policy factors, discussed in section IV. 
III A New Precedent? Assessing the Relevance of Allenby 
In Allenby, a case concerning pregnancy following a failed sterilisation 
operation, the Supreme Court adopted a broader interpretation of physical 
injury. This section considers the implications of that new interpretation for 
sufferers of CPS. Previously, the definition of physical injury adopted in 
Teen was not limited to situations of CPS and was also applied in the 
pregnancy context. In several cases the 1992 legislation was interpreted to 
mean that pregnancy does not constitute a physical injury.
44
 The Court of 
                                                            
39 Teen, above n 5, at [36]. 
40 Teen v Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation HC 
Wellington CIV-2003-485-1478, 11 November 2003 at [35]. 
41 For example in Mura v Accident Compensation Corporation [2003] NZACC 133 at [24]; 
Coulter v Accident Compensation Corporation [2003] NZACC 298 at [16]; and Mitchell v 
Accident Compensation Corporation [2011] NZACC 247 at [16]. 
42 Accident Compensation Corporation "Glossary of ACC terms" <http://www.acc.co.nz> 
This orthodox position was also reflected in KL Sandford Personal injury by accident 
under the Accident Compensation Act: A Commentary (Accident Compensation 
Commission, Wellington, 1979) at 68–69. 
43
 Ministerial Advisory Panel Report of the Ministerial Advisory Panel on Work-related 
Gradual Process, Disease or Infection: Section 31 Injury, Prevention, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 2001 (Wellington, 2005) at [66]. 
44
  DK v Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation [1995] NZACC 
90; [1995] NZAR 529 (DC); and MM v Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Insurance Corporation [1996] NZACC 79.  
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Appeal confirmed this finding in ACC v D where a woman who fell 
pregnant following a failed tubal ligation operation had sought ACC cover. 
The majority in that case cited Teen with approval in holding that the term 
physical injury "suggest[s] a need for harm or damage".
45
 This meant that 
pregnancy was not a physical injury and ACC cover was unavailable.  
A The Decision in Allenby 
The Solicitor General made the same argument in Allenby as was accepted 
in ACC v D: that pregnancy is not a physical injury as it is a biological 
process which does not damage a woman's anatomy.46 The plaintiff in 
Allenby suffered mental injuries after becoming pregnant following a failed 
sterilisation procedure.  
The Supreme Court unanimously adopted a more expansive interpretation of 
physical injury and rejected the argument that, given the absence of bodily 
damage, pregnancy cannot constitute an injury.  The majority judgment of 
Blanchard, McGrath and William Young JJ noted that pregnancy "causes 
significant physical changes to the woman’s anatomy, which… cause 
discomfort and, at least ultimately, pain and suffering".
47
 Given that diseases 
or infections consequential on medical misadventure can be classed as 
personal injury, the majority argued that including pregnancy as a personal 
injury does not involve "any great stretching of language".
48
  
Elias CJ similarly held that, if a sprain or strain amounts to personal injury, 
"impregnation (with its profound impact on the physiology of the woman) is 
properly seen as a physical injury".49 The physical impacts of pregnancy are 
"more than merely transitory and of greater consequence than the examples 
given of a strain or sprain".50 Likewise, Tipping J highlighted that the 
                                                            
45 Accident Compensation Corporation v D [2008] NZCA 576 at [55] per Arnold and Ellen 
France JJ; William Young P dissenting.  
46 Allenby v H [2012] NZSC 33 at [79].  
47 At [80]. 
48 At [80]. 
49 At [18]. 
50 At [19]. 
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physical changes which occur during pregnancy cause pain and suffering 
and are of greater consequence and duration than a strain or sprain.51  
The interpretation that physical injury requires damage to the anatomy, as 
applied in Teen and accepted in ACC v D in the pregnancy context, was 
therefore not upheld by the Supreme Court.  The Court instead adopted a 
wider interpretation of the term physical injury. Physiological changes with 
impacts which are "more than merely transitory" compared to a strain or 
sprain, and cause pain and suffering, were deemed sufficient. For Tennent, 
"[a]dopting the position of the Supreme Court in Allenby, a physiological 
change causing pain amounts to a physical injury for the purposes of the 
accident compensation legislation".52  
B Application of Allenby to Chronic Pain Syndrome 
The expanded interpretation of what constitutes a physical injury adopted in 
Allenby arguably has implications for sufferers of primary CPS. The 
reasoning is reminiscent of the Waitemata decision where Judge Beattie 
found that CPS was a physical injury because "it is a change which is 
harmful as it is a change which is causing pain".53 The Judges in Allenby did 
not consider the broader applicability of their interpretation and the CPS 
issue was not considered in their judgment. Nonetheless, CPS demonstrates 
many of the features which the Court relied on in deeming pregnancy a 
physical injury. The Court's emphasis on bodily change is satisfied in the 
case of CPS; all medical specialists in Teen accepted that CPS involved 
physiological changes.54 Much like pregnancy, CPS causes substantial pain 
and discomfort for the sufferer and its effects are more than merely 
transitory – Ms Teen for example was deemed unfit to work. It too has 
greater impact on the person than the statutory examples of a strain or 
sprain. A case can therefore be advanced that Teen and the line of authority 
which has excluded CPS from classification as a physical injury should be 
revisited.  
                                                            
51 At [88]. 
52 Doug Tennent Accident Compensation Law (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013) at 33. 
53 Waitemata Health Ltd v Ace Insurance Ltd, above n 35, at [47]. 
54 Teen, above n 3, at 13. 
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This expanded interpretation of physical injury cannot simply be 
superimposed from the pregnancy context into a CPS situation to 
immediately undermine the conclusion in Teen. The Allenby reasoning did 
not rely solely on the bodily changes and impacts of pregnancy; parts of the 
decision do not apply in the CPS context. Possible distinguishing features, 
considered in turn below, are the Court’s reliance on the legislative history 
specific to pregnancy, the scheme of the Act which separates out the various 
causes of personal injury, and policy factors.  
1 Possible distinguishing features 
The first distinguishing point and a major factor in the Supreme Court's 
decision was the "tortuous history" of accident compensation legislation.
55
 
The scheme was extended in 1974 to specifically cover pregnancy resulting 
from rape. The removal of this reference to pregnancy in 1992 did not 
exclude pregnancy from cover; had Parliament intended this it would, 
reasoned the majority, have done so expressly.56 As impregnation is a 
physical injury covered under the scheme when it results from rape, 
impregnation is also a physical injury when it results from medical 
misadventure.57 This follows from the Act’s separation of the question of 
personal injury from the cause of that injury, meaning the standalone 
definition of personal injury is the same for the various covered causes 
listed in the legislation.58  
An analogous argument cannot be advanced in the case of CPS as there has 
never been express reference to the condition as a personal injury. 
A second possible distinguishing feature is that primary CPS claims fall 
under the cause "work-related gradual process, disease or infection", 
whereas pregnancy is covered as either an accident or treatment injury.  One 
might contend that the Allenby interpretation of physical injury does not 
apply to CPS given that it falls under a different cause. This difference is not 
                                                            
55 Allenby, above n 46, at [68]. 
56 At [68]. 
57 At [76]. 
58 At [76]. 
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material as the legislative scheme is to provide a common definition of 
personal injury in s 26, separate from the various causes of that injury. The 
Supreme Court relied on this separation in holding that the answer to 
whether pregnancy is a personal injury must "logically be the same in 
respect of both causes. The fact that one results from medical misadventure 
and the other from accident cannot make any difference."59 Applying this 
reasoning, the interpretation of physical injury should not differ in CPS 
cases simply because it falls under a different cause. 
The Court also stated that the medical misadventure provisions (since 
replaced by the treatment injury regime) provide an exception to the no fault 
nature of the scheme, which "may suggest that they are concerned with 
things which are not ordinarily to be classed as physical injuries".60 This 
reasoning seems to introduce a different test when determining what 
constitutes a physical injury in the medical misadventure context. The 
Court’s interpretation of physical injury by reference to its cause is 
inconsistent with their aforementioned logic concerning the separation of 
these two questions. Consequently, limited weight should be placed on this 
distinguishing point. 
Policy factors which pointed towards pregnancy being covered were also 
relevant to the decision. Whilst recognising that the 1992 reform was in 
response to cost increases, Blanchard J considered that the costs relating to 
pregnancy were not substantial in the overall context of the scheme and 
noted that there were just 72 claims for pregnancy resulting from medical 
misadventure over 11 years.61 Elias CJ similarly found that there were no 
convincing reasons based on the statute's purpose for refusing to treat 
pregnancy as a physical injury.62  
The Supreme Court in Allenby adopted a broader interpretation of physical 
injury which does not require damage to the anatomy. The case is not 
directly on point and therefore would not bind a lower court considering 
                                                            
59 At [87]. 
60 At [63]. 
61 At [69]. 
62 At [19]. 
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whether CPS is a physical injury. Nonetheless, and as the following 
discussion demonstrates, it remains arguable that the Allenby interpretation 
of physical injury should be applied in the CPS context.  
2 The Court's broader reasoning 
Before Allenby, cases had sought consistency in the definition of physical 
injury. For example, the Court of Appeal in ACC v D made reference with 
approval to the reasoning in Teen despite the fact that one dealt with 
pregnancy and the other with CPS. The majority in ACC v D also 
recognised that their decision would have broader consequences for the 
interpretation of the legislation and was not limited to the pregnancy 
context; as part of their reasoning, they considered that:
63
 
…there is some force in the Corporation’s submission that the 
Judge’s approach in this case may have wider consequences for the 
legislation and in particular has the potential to introduce a more 
subjective approach to determining what is a personal injury. 
Given that there is little statutory guidance defining physical injury, only the 
examples of a strain or sprain, it is desirable for the courts to develop a 
standard and generally applicable interpretation.   
Furthermore, whilst the Supreme Court's reasoning was grounded to an 
extent in factors specific to pregnancy like the legislative history, the Court's 
judgment should not be so narrowly construed. The majority stated that the 
expression personal injury is "used in an expansive way";
64
 while the Chief 
Justice contended that the phrase "must be interpreted in the light of the 
purposes of the Act which are concerned with establishing entitlements for 
impairment, rehabilitation, and treatment".
65 
This broad focus on the 
principle of comprehensive cover is important given its contrast to the 
narrow interpretation reliant on the principle of damage as adopted in ACC v 
                                                            
63 Accident Compensation Corporation v D, above n 45, at [66] (emphasis added). 
64 Allenby, above n 46, at [69]. 
65 At [18]. 
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D.66 For Hazel Armstrong, the decision is notable because the Court has 
"yet again mandated that the ACC legislation be interpreted expansively".67  
Consequently, the question of ACC entitlement for CPS, previously settled 
by Teen as excluded from cover, could nevertheless be reopened in light of 
Allenby. Tennent considers that Allenby provides "an opportunity, indeed an 
obligation" to reconsider ACC cover for CPS.68 The issue is whether the 
courts should apply the wider Allenby interpretation of physical injury – 
which emphasises bodily changes accompanied by pain and suffering, 
without requiring damage – beyond the pregnancy context. If it did so, CPS 
would constitute a physical injury and upon proving workplace causation 
claimants would be entitled to ACC cover. However, while Allenby 
provides a significant precedent by which the outcome in Teen can be 
questioned, the courts would not be able to rely on that precedent alone 
without considering the many policy factors relevant to the issue. The 
following section contends that policy factors point away from an expansive 
interpretation of physical injury and demand that the status quo be 
maintained.  
IV Policy Rationale for Excluding Cover 
Considering the purpose and policy behind legislation is a key part of 
statutory interpretation.69  Todd contends that the purpose section in the 
ACC legislation gives little guidance on resolving boundary issues and 
instead it is necessary to look to sources beyond the statute.
70
 The first 
source considered below, the principles of the Woodhouse Report, is shown 
to be of limited value in determining where the precise boundaries of the 
scheme should lie.  
                                                            
66 Pratima Namasivayam "Wrongful Conception: An Introduction into Entitlements Post-
Allenby" (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2013) at 13. 
67 Hazel Armstrong and Kristen Bunn "Allenby v H (Medical Misadventure)" (10 May 
2012) Hazel Armstrong Law <http://hazelarmstronglaw.co.nz>. 
68 Tennent, above n 52, at 34. 
69 Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1).  
70 Stephen Todd "The Court of Appeal, Accident Compensation and Tort Litigation" in 
Rick Bigwood (ed) The Permanent New Zealand Court of Appeal: Essays on the First 50 
Years (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) 152 at 178. 
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A The Woodhouse Principles 
The Woodhouse Report articulated five general principles which underpin 
the scheme, namely: community responsibility, comprehensive entitlement, 
complete rehabilitation, real compensation and administrative efficiency.
71
  
Community responsibility and comprehensive entitlement were considered 
the foundational principles of the scheme.72 Community responsibility holds 
that, given the benefits that society derives from the productive work of its 
citizens, society should accept responsibility for those who cannot work due 
to physical incapacity.73 For Oliphant, the principle demands that the mere 
fact of incapacity which deprives an individual of the ability to contribute to 
society's general welfare triggers the community's obligation to provide 
support.74 
The Woodhouse principle of administrative efficiency is relevant to this 
issue but is better addressed in the context of the following section.  
An emphasis on these principles points towards providing ACC cover to 
CPS sufferers. The incapacity experienced is great; many lose their job or 
their condition makes them unsuitable for previous workplace tasks.75 
Community responsibility demands that society recognises the collective 
benefits previously contributed by these sufferers through their work and in 
response provides them with rehabilitation and compensation. On this view, 
it is counterproductive to exclude a group of incapacitated workers and, 
through the denial of funded rehabilitation, reduce the likelihood that they 
will return to work.  
                                                            
71 New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of 
Inquiry (Government Printer, Wellington, 1967) (The Woodhouse Report) at [4]. 
72 At [4]–[7].   
73 At [56]. 
74 Ken Oliphant "Beyond Woodhouse: Devising New Principles for Determining ACC 
Boundary Issues" (2004) 35 VUWLR 915 at 917. 
75
 Allen and Clarke Defining Work-Related Harm: Implications for Diagnosis, 
Rehabilitation, Compensation and Prevention (National Occupational Health and Safety 
Advisory Committee, Wellington, 2009) at 123.  
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Limited weight should however be placed on the Woodhouse principles. 
While critical to the establishment of ACC, the principles point towards a 
wholly comprehensive scheme which covers all forms of incapacity whether 
due to disease or accident.
76
 There are strong arguments for this form of 
comprehensive scheme and the Woodhouse Report itself recognised the 
current distinction between accident and illness as pragmatic rather than 
principled.
77
 
Nonetheless, we must work within the confines of the scheme currently in 
place. As McLay points out the present scheme is not "unniggardly"78 and, 
although we might dislike its limited scope, the courts must take seriously 
Parliament's failure to enact a truly comprehensive scheme.79 McLay 
suggests that:80 
Rather than focussing solely on the Woodhouse principle of 
'comprehensive entitlement', the overriding concern of courts in 
considering cases under the ACC scheme ought to be the integrity 
of the legislation actually given to us by Parliament. Where 
possible, judges might refer to Sir Owen Woodhouse's grand 
vision, but until we actually go about implementing that vision 
fully, integrity ought to demand that we take seriously the often 
quite deliberate gaps in entitlement. 
The deliberate gaps to which McLay refers were incorporated in the 1992 
legislation, as largely re-enacted in 1998 and 2001. Its purpose was to draw 
back from Woodhouse's vision in favour of a universal scheme.81 Although 
the Government which implemented the 1992 reforms confirmed that the 
                                                            
76 Oliphant, above n 74, at 915. 
77
 The Woodhouse Report, above n 71, at [17]. For further discussion of whether a more 
comprehensive scheme would be desirable see, for example, New Zealand Law 
Commission Personal Injury: Prevention and Recovery: Report on the Accident 
Compensation Scheme (NZLC R4, Wellington 1988); and Grant Duncan "Boundary 
Disputes in the ACC Scheme and the No-Fault Principle" [2008] NZ L Rev 27.  
78 See Accident Compensation Corporation v Mitchell [1992] 2 NZLR 436 (CA) at 438 per 
Richardson J for the original quote to which McLay is referring. 
79 Geoff McLay "Accident Compensation – What's the Common Law Got to Do With It?" 
[2008] NZ L Rev 55 at 73. 
80 At 74. 
81 Todd, above n 70, at 178. 
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Woodhouse principles remained sound,82 their continuing relevance is 
questionable given that the present scheme "so manifestly fails to give effect 
to [them]".83  
Giving effect to the Woodhouse principles indicates that CPS should be 
covered by ACC, but also demands that all diseases be covered. The 
principles are general and holistic and therefore provide little assistance in 
determining precise boundary disputes, like the one at issue here, within the 
limited scheme currently in place.84 Consequently it is necessary to look 
beyond the Woodhouse principles for other relevant policy factors against 
which this specific boundary issue can be evaluated. 
B Other Relevant Policy Factors 
Given the limited utility of the Woodhouse principles in assessing this issue, 
the following section evaluates the broader interpretation of physical injury 
against a wider range of policy factors. These principles demand that the 
status quo, which excludes CPS from classification as a physical injury, is 
maintained.
85
 
1 The need for clear boundaries 
The first relevant policy factor is the need for clear boundaries marking the 
edges of the scheme. Given that the scheme is limited in scope, the meaning 
of physical injury should clearly delineate the boundary between conditions 
which are covered and those which are not. The status quo best achieves this 
clarity.  
The need for clear boundaries is similar to the Woodhouse principle of 
administrative efficiency, which requires that benefits are distributed rapidly 
                                                            
82 Geoffrey Palmer "New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: 20 Years On" (1994) 
44 U Toronto LJ 223 at 226. 
83 Oliphant, above n 74, at 925. 
84 At 915. 
85 Whilst this paper considers whether CPS should constitute a physical injury from the 
perspective of the courts faced with this issue, the same policy arguments would apply if 
Parliament were considering whether to legislatively define physical injury in a manner 
which includes CPS. 
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and without contention, but is more extensive than the original principle.86 
Clear boundaries are essential because the scheme's financial viability rests 
on a quid pro quo calculation that generous and comprehensive 
compensation is possible due to the absence of costly and time-consuming 
litigation. Money spent by ACC litigating contentious cases reduces the 
"pot" of funds available to compensate claimants. The interpretation of 
physical injury adopted by the court should seek to mark clearly where 
entitlement ends and therefore limit the number of cases contesting where 
the precise boundaries of the scheme lie.  
Adopting a broader interpretation of physical injury which includes CPS is 
likely to substantially increase ligation costs, uncertainty and delay. 
Although claimants would have overcome the first hurdle to entitlement by 
showing the existence of a personal injury, they must still show that their 
CPS was caused by their work to receive ACC cover. There is substantial 
disagreement in the medical community as to whether CPS can be caused 
by repetitive action in unsatisfactory working environments, which means 
that proving workplace causation is likely to require litigation. 
The consensus position reached among medical experts was that CPS is not 
caused by work. A 1998 "Consensus Meeting" of medical experts sought to 
develop an agreed position on CPS and particularly fibromyalgia. Their 
conclusions included that there is very little evidence to support a link 
between work and fibromyalgia and in the context of keyboard work there is 
no supportive data at all.87 This was accepted in Teen when Judge Beattie 
not only denied the existence of a physical injury but also denied that Ms 
Teen had shown the required causal connection between her workplace 
activities and her CPS.88  
This consensus position has been subject to much criticism. Judge 
Middleton called it "a matter of real concern" that the Consensus Meeting 
"appears to have been convened for the specific purpose of providing a 
                                                            
86 The Woodhouse Report, above n 71, at [62]. 
87 Teen, above n 3, at 7. 
88 Teen, above n 5, at [37]. 
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policy by which claims for [CPS] could be declined".89 One doctor called 
the consensus decision "premature" since there are medical professionals, 
including himself, who believe that CPS can be triggered by repetitive 
workplace actions or constrained postures.
90
   
Some commentators have treated the problem of whether CPS is in fact 
caused by work as a minor issue.91 Tennent for instance cited Mitchell v 
ACC to show that it is possible to prove that CPS is work-related.
92
 In that 
case Judge Ongley, while holding that the claimant's CPS was not a covered 
personal injury, found that there was a temporal connection which suggested 
that the appellant's work had caused his CPS.
93
 While a temporal connection 
can be "an important piece of circumstantial evidence",94 several cases have 
held that a temporal connection is not itself sufficient to establish that a 
personal injury is work-related.
95
 Furthermore, Judge Ongley admitted that 
the causation analysis would have "needed closer attention" had the 
appellant first established the existence of a personal injury.96 Thus proving 
that CPS is work-related will be substantially more difficult than some 
commentators have concluded.  
These vastly different medical opinions indicate that the adoption of a wider 
interpretation of physical injury would not ensure that CPS sufferers have 
cover. Instead, it is likely that the disagreement between medical specialists 
regarding causation will play out in the courts. The Woodhouse Report saw 
the negligence tort as a form of lottery.97 Classing CPS as a physical injury 
is, due to the lack of unanimity in the medical community about causation, 
                                                            
89 Teen, above n 3, at 12. 
90 New Zealand Press Association "Fibromyalgia sufferers could sue employers – law 
expert" The Royal Society of New Zealand / Te Aparangi (23 March 1998) 
<http://www.royalsociety.org.nz> 
91 See for example Ministerial Advisory Panel, above n 43, at [66]; and Tennent, above n 
52, at 32.  
92 Tennent, above n 52, at 32, discussing Mitchell v Accident Compensation Corporation 
[2011] NZACC 247 at [24]. 
93 Mitchell v Accident Compensation Corporation, above n 92, at [23]. 
94 Oliver v Accident Compensation Corporation [2008] NZACC 34 at [32]. 
95 Gazzard v Accident Compensation Corporation [2001] NZACC 313 at [34]; Humphreys 
v Accident Compensation Corporation [2001] NZACC 234 at [18]; and Nickolls v Accident 
Compensation Corporation [2000] NZACC 54 at 22. 
96 Mitchell v Accident Compensation Corporation, above n 92, at [18] 
97 The Woodhouse Report, above n 71, at [1]. 
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likely to create inconsistent and fluctuating outcomes reflecting the lottery 
which Woodhouse sought to avoid.  
In contrast, the finding in Teen successfully demarcated the boundary of the 
scheme by making it clear that CPS was not a physical injury. Doctors and 
lawyers could use this general rule to assess a client's claim and the 
likelihood of a successful appeal. This noticeably reduced the number of 
claims as, after a series of other cases in which Teen was applied, claimants 
have largely stopped bringing primary CPS appeals.  
Drawing a clear line by which CPS sufferers are excluded from cover is 
harsh to those incapacitated people. However it reflects the reality that ACC 
is a limited scheme in which cover is systematically denied to people with 
non-work-related illnesses. As pointed out by Elias CJ in Allenby "the 
[scheme] provides cover on the basis of line-drawing which reflects policy 
choices".98 To ensure that limited funds are directed towards compensation 
and rehabilitation, where they are most useful, rather than towards litigation, 
these lines should be clearly defined. The existing position effectively marks 
the boundaries of the scheme, whereas adopting the broader interpretation of 
physical injury will blur its edges, promoting litigation where entitlement 
will be entirely dependent on the vastly different medical opinions presented 
in and accepted by the court.   
2 The purpose of the separate personal injury requirement 
The second relevant policy factor is the purpose of the standalone 
requirement that a claimant show personal injury. Since 1992 the ACC 
legislation has created two hurdles a claimant must overcome before they 
are entitled to cover. They must first prove the existence of a personal injury 
and then prove that it was caused in one of several listed circumstances. 
Requiring that claimant's first show the existence of a personal injury 
separate from its cause provides a key limit on the scope of ACC cover. The 
following section discusses how an interpretation of physical injury which 
                                                            
98 Allenby, above n 46, at [7] per Elias CJ. 
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includes CPS undermines the legislative scheme which has been in place 
since 1992. 
The narrow interpretation of physical injury adopted in Teen, which requires 
damage to the anatomy, not only excludes CPS but many other medical 
conditions from classification as physical injuries. Professor Gorman called 
it "nonsense" to argue that CPS is an injury due to the body's physical 
changes.
99
  Adopting that interpretation would mean that conditions like 
diabetes, migraine headaches and rheumatoid arthritis would also constitute 
injuries given their associated physical changes.100 "Indeed" he considered 
"by the definition of physical changes = injury, all diseases would be 
injuries."101  
Adopting this wider interpretation of physical injury will therefore not only 
affect the scope of cover for CPS but risks increasing the number of ACC 
claims for other medical conditions. The standalone requirement for 
personal injury is seen as having an important filtering effect by limiting 
ACC entitlement.
102
 This filtering effect would be undermined if virtually 
any disease could be classed as a physical injury. In addition, given that 
psychological factors may be a cause of CPS, classifying the condition as a 
physical injury blurs the distinction within the legislation between physical 
and mental injuries. 
Judge Beattie in Waitemata dismissed these concerns; he considered that 
even if conditions like migraines are classified as a personal injury the 
claimant would not be entitled to cover unless they show that it was caused 
in one of the required ways.103 The definition of personal injury recognises 
that it can include a gradual process, disease or infection but expressly 
excludes these from cover unless they are work-related or arise as a 
treatment injury.
104
  
                                                            
99 Waitemata Health Ltd v Ace Insurance Ltd, above n 35, at [33]. 
100 At [33]. 
101 At [33]. 
102 Garton v Accident Compensation Corporation [2004] NZACC 151 at [39]. 
103 Waitemata Health Ltd v Ace Insurance Ltd, above n 35, at [45]. 
104 At [45]. 
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There is some strength to Judge Beattie's contention. For example, as 
migraines are normally classified as diseases,105 a claimant must show that 
the condition was work-related or caused by treatment.106  Hence the real 
filtering section is proving that a condition is work-related.
107
 Showing that 
an injury was caused by treatment will also be substantial hurdle to cover; a 
claim seeking cover for migraines following physiotherapy treatment was 
rejected because there was no physical injury and also no causative link.
108
 
There is therefore no risk that migraine sufferers will suddenly be entitled 
en masse to ACC cover. However this does not fully address the problem. 
Additional litigation would likely be encouraged since the first obstacle to 
entitlement, showing the existence of a personal injury, would be overcome. 
There may be circumstances where the requisite causal connection is 
established meaning that cover would be available to a wider class of 
claimants. Defining physical injury narrowly better limits the scope of cover 
rather than relying on a case-by-case causation analysis as would be 
required if the wider interpretation were adopted.  
Furthermore, classing a broader range of conditions as physical injuries is 
problematic because it disregards the legislative framework. As quoted in 
full above, McLay contends that, when dealing with cases at the boundaries 
of the scheme, courts must uphold the integrity of the legislation passed by 
Parliament and take seriously the deliberate gaps in entitlement.109 A key 
component in the 1992 reform was the creation of a standalone requirement 
for personal injury independent from its cause. Interpreting physical injury 
so broadly that all diseases would meet the test makes the first requirement 
of cover redundant. This cannot have been intended by Parliament when 
deliberately creating the standalone requirement and therefore fails to 
uphold the integrity of legislation currently in place.  
Another purpose of the separate requirement for personal injury, as 
contended by Judge Cadenhead, is to provide an objective point of reference 
                                                            
105 Robinson v Accident Compensation Corporation [2005] NZACC 243 at [14]. 
106 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 26(2). 
107 See Teen, above n 40, at [26]. 
108 Robinson v Accident Compensation Corporation, above n 105, at [28]. 
109 McLay, above n 79, at 74.  
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by which an injury can be progressively monitored.110 He has stated on 
several occasions that "[w]ithout some significant external signposts this 
process would be fraught with difficulty".111 By adopting the proposed 
wider interpretation without an objective point of reference, it becomes 
more difficult to monitor a claimant's condition, therefore paving the way 
for malingering.112  
Malingering is often considered a major risk in the CPS context given the 
subjective nature of pain. An analogy has been drawn between CPS and the 
Australian experience with Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI) in the 1980s. 
Following rapid increases in the number of RSI claims, compensation rules 
became more stringent, suddenly reducing the number of reported cases.113 
Specialist physician Dr Alchin contended that "to cover such cases by 
workers compensation benefits… is in fact a potent cause of these cases".
114
 
The provision of compensation causes or exacerbates the condition by:115  
…encouraging a belief that a worker's acute but minor pain is 
actually sinister, as it is recognised by workers' compensation as 
"compensable injury" … It therefore encourages the adoption of an 
invalid role and "illness behaviour", by legitimising and facilitating 
the role of a chronic invalid. 
There are conflicting studies on the extent of the risk posed by malingering. 
One study found that fibromyalgia is more prevalent in Amish populations, 
who do not seek compensation for their condition, than non-Amish 
                                                            
110 Garton v Accident Compensation Corporation, above n 102, at [39]. 
111 At [39]. Judge Cadenhead made the same point in Mura v Accident Compensation 
Corporation, above n 41, at [24]. 
112 Malingering is defined as "the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated 
physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as avoiding 
military duty, avoiding work [and] obtaining financial compensation". American 
Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed, 
American Psychiatric Association, Washington D.C., 1994) at 683 as cited in Daniel Slick, 
Elisabeth Sherman and Grant Iverson "Diagnostic Criteria for Malingered Neurocognitive 
Dysfunction: Proposed Standards for Clinical Practice and Research" (1999) 13 The 
Clinical Neuropsychologist 545 at 546.  
113 Gregory C Gardner "Fibromyalgia Following Trauma: Psychology or Biology?" (2000) 
4 Current Review of Pain 295 at 298. 
114 Teen, above n 3, at 6. 
115 At 6. 
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populations.116 This counters the idea that fibromyalgia is exaggerated by 
sufferers motivated by financial incentives. On the other hand, a number of 
inexplicable anomalies were highlighted during the RSI epidemic in 
Australia: RSI was rare in self-employed subjects and more common in 
those with little job satisfaction; companies with branches in Australia and 
Europe noted the problem only in their Australian employees; and 
incidences of the condition were higher during the school holidays.
117
   
The risk of malingering is exacerbated by the limited tests available for 
diagnosis. A diagnosis of fibromyalgia requires that patients "complain of 
widespread musculoskeletal pain and that they exhibit excessive tenderness 
when mild pressure… is applied at 11 or more among 18 predetermined 
anatomical sites".118 This "tender points test" has been subject to a great deal 
of criticism and validation of the results is "difficult or impossible".
119
 The 
risk of malingering is therefore substantial and, although unfortunate for 
legitimate sufferers of the condition, provides a further objection to 
providing ACC cover. 
3 Entitlement under the common law 
The scope of entitlement under the common law is an additional principle 
by which the wider interpretation of physical injury can be assessed. The 
majority in Allenby considered it problematic that health professionals may 
have to pay for additional insurance cover on top of compulsory ACC levies 
if pregnancy following failed sterilisation was not covered under the 
scheme.120 A large number of civil claims by CPS sufferers against their 
employers would therefore provide justification for extending cover to 
                                                            
116 Kevin P White and John Thompson "Fibromyalgia syndrome in an Amish community: 
controlled study to determine disease and symptom prevalence" (2003) 30 J Rheumatology 
1835 at 1835. 
117 PA Reilly "Fibromyalgia in the workplace: a ‘management’ problem" (1993) 52 Ann 
Rheum Dis 249 at 250.  
118 Frederick Wolfe and others "The American College of Rheumatology 1990 criteria for 
the classification of fibromyalgia" (1990) 33 Arthritis Rheum 160 at 160–172 as cited in 
Wurtman, above n 7, at 37. 
119 Frederick Wolfe "The Fibromyalgia Syndrome: A Consensus Report on Fibromyalgia 
and Disability" (1996) 23 J Rheumatology 534 at 535. For further criticism of the tender 
points test see Everest, above n 26, at 1038–1040. 
120 Allenby, above n 46, at [77]. 
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primary CPS. John Miller highlighted the possibility that employers may 
have to take out insurance against civil claims in addition to paying ACC 
levies.121  
In practice however, this author is not aware of any cases of primary CPS 
taken against an employer following a denial of ACC cover. In addition to 
the aforementioned difficulties in establishing workplace causation, it would 
likely be very difficult to prove that the ergonomics of a particular 
workplace were negligent. The scope of entitlement under the common law 
does not therefore provide any impetus to extend cover to CPS; there is no 
abundance of claims against employers which demand that they take out 
additional insurance.  
4 Financial implications 
A fourth factor by which the proposed interpretation of physical injury 
should be assessed is its financial implications. Commentators have 
criticised "unreflective judicial expansionism" which has threatened to 
undermine the scheme's fiscal sustainability.
122
 Given that courts cannot 
adjust levy rates it is problematic when expansive judicial decisions upset 
the financial calculations on which rates are set.123 Consequently, the 
financial implications of a proposed extension should have some bearing on 
the court’s decision-making, as occurred in Allenby when the Judges 
considered that the low cost of their decision permitted the expansion to 
covering pregnancy.124 In contrast, the Department of Labour in 2007 
estimated that the cost of expanding cover to work-related pain conditions 
was between $5.3 and $20.1 million per annum, likely $10.2 million per 
annum.125 These substantial costs make it less appropriate for the courts to 
extend cover to CPS.  
                                                            
121 New Zealand Press Association, above n 90. 
122 Todd, above n 70, at 178. Todd was referring here to Oliphant, above n 74, at 922–6.  
123 Oliphant, above n 74, at 922. 
124 Allenby, above n 46, at [69]. 
125 Department of Labour "Paper 2: Legislative Options for Expanding Cover for Work-
Related Gradual Process, Disease, and Infection" (Wellington, 18 May 2007) at 6 
(Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 request to the author). 
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Furthermore, an analysis of the financial implications should also consider 
the likelihood of successful treatment. Ideally, the provision of rehabilitation 
by ACC means that claimants can return to work and productivity more 
rapidly. There are of course certain serious injuries which are covered by the 
scheme despite the impossibility of a return to work. Nonetheless in 
considering less-severe borderline cases a cost-benefit analysis by which the 
potential for a return to productivity can be assessed is relevant. 
Extending ACC cover to CPS would not likely produce the desired return to 
productivity which could justify the high cost of rehabilitation. 
Rehabilitating CPS is a long-term and intensive process.
126
 It requires an 
expensive interdisciplinary model of care which addresses the multiple 
components of the pain condition, including medication, physical therapy, 
behavioural interventions, vocational training and evaluation.
127
 The 
treatment requires repeated assessment and adjustment and although total 
cure is possible it is infrequent.128 Consequently, the potential for increased 
productivity derived from funding rehabilitation is lower than in conditions 
with a clearer and more consistent path to recovery.  
While the Woodhouse principles point to the adoption of a wide 
interpretation of physical injury which includes CPS, limited weight should 
be placed on them. Instead, a broader range of policy factors more 
appropriate to assessing precise boundary issues demands that the status quo 
be maintained. Given the conclusion that CPS should continue to be 
excluded from classification as a physical injury, the following section 
considers what, if any, action should be taken by Parliament. 
                                                            
126 Department of Labour "Draft Legislative Options for Expanding Cover for Work-
Related Conditions" (Wellington, 5 April 2007) at 12 (Obtained under Official Information 
Act 1982 request to the author). 
127 Michael A Ashburn and Peter S Staats "Management of Chronic Pain" (1999) 353 The 
Lancet 1865 at 1865.   
128 At 1865.   
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V What Should Be Done? 
A No Legislative Change 
As policy reasons support the status quo position, one option is to simply do 
nothing and let the issue play out in the courts. Allenby provides an 
opportunity to re-litigate this issue in court and, as outlined above, there are 
convincing arguments to both distinguish Allenby from CPS cases or to read 
Allenby in an expansive way which undermines the reasoning adopted in 
Teen. It is more likely that Allenby would be limited to its facts and 
particular legislative history, meaning a judge would continue to apply the 
Teen rationale for excluding CPS from cover.129 Although the Court was 
willing to allow cover for pregnancy in Allenby, policy factors there 
including the legislative history and low cost impact pointed towards 
extending the scheme. Here however policy factors suggest a continuing 
exclusion of CPS.  
Furthermore, when considering whether to expand entitlement, courts 
should consider the parliamentary history of legislation, including 
committee and commission reports and parliamentary debates.
130
 
Legislative change which would extend cover to CPS has been suggested in 
government reports,131 select committee submissions,132 and briefing 
materials prepared for a Minister.
133
 The fact that, despite substantial 
consideration of the issue, Parliament has not passed legislation extending 
cover to CPS indicates that the courts should not step in to expand the 
                                                            
129 See RN v Accident Compensation Corporation [2012] NZACC 273 for an example of 
counsel seeking to apply the Allenby interpretation of physical injury to a factually distinct 
situation. Judge Ongley at [27] rejected the argument and concluded that Allenby was not 
relevant.  
130 Todd, above n 70, at 178. 
131 Ministerial Advisory Panel, above n 43, at [137]. 
132 Ken Mackinnon "Submission to the Transport and Industrial Relations Select Committee 
on the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008" 
at 1–2; Michael Gibson "Submission to the Transport and Industrial Relations Select 
Committee on the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Amendment Bill 
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Industrial Relations Select Committee on the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and 
Compensation Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008" at 2. 
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scheme. Consequently it is unlikely that CPS will become covered through 
court action meaning the preferable status quo will be maintained.   
B Refine the Definition of Physical Injury 
A second option which upholds the status quo is a legislative amendment to 
refine the definition of physical injury. This could take two forms. The first 
is amending the provision which defines physical injury, s 26(1)(b) of the 
2001 Act, to require actual damage to the anatomy. This recognises that 
pain cannot constitute injury and reflects the interpretation of physical 
injury adopted in Teen.  This "pre-emptive change" would prevent the courts 
from adopting the Allenby precedent as justification for classing CPS as a 
physical injury.   
Enacting such a definition would provide greater clarity for interpreters and 
eliminate some arguments over the appropriate boundaries of the scheme. A 
definition of physical injury has never been included in accident 
compensation legislation. Instead, with only the guidance provided by the 
statutory examples of strain and sprain, Parliament has left it to the courts to 
grapple with the correct interpretation and balance concepts of harm or 
damage against the purpose of the scheme. In some respects this position is 
unsatisfactory given that the Woodhouse Report, noting that there would be 
hard cases resulting from the scheme, considered that legislation should aim 
to define as clearly as possible what was covered and what was not.134  
There are however several problems with enacting a more precise definition. 
It would have implications for other conditions presently covered by the 
scheme. For example, this amendment would undermine the reasoning in 
Allenby and instead reflect the finding in the earlier ACC v D decision, once 
again excluding pregnancy from cover. This could be remedied through a 
specific pregnancy provision which clarifies that pregnancy constitutes a 
personal injury but, as in Allenby, explicitly limits cover to cases of sexual 
violation and treatment injury. 
                                                            
134 The Woodhouse Report, above n 71, at [289(b)]. 
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Whilst a pregnancy provision would be fairly easily implemented, the need 
for such a provision reflects a broader problem. The scheme is so large that 
it quickly becomes impractical, and requires an unrealistic level of 
engagement from Parliament, if changes to its scope demand a litany of 
specific amendments. Defining physical injury could also prevent 
unforeseen but principled future developments from taking place; had a 
narrow definition been enacted earlier, a case like Allenby would have been 
prevented. This amendment is therefore undesirable because it responds to a 
small problem – the low risk that CPS will be covered through judicial 
action – in an undiscerning and disproportionate way.  
Consequently, a second legislative amendment is preferable. This would add 
a further paragraph to s 26 which clarifies that personal injury caused by 
work-related gradual process, disease or infection can include pain that is a 
direct consequence of a lesion of the somatosensory system, meaning 
physical damage to the body's pain pathways. This amendment was 
proposed by the Department of Labour
135
 and supported by the Law 
Society.136 It codifies the status quo by maintaining the requirement of 
damage to the anatomy, meaning CPS would not itself constitute a physical 
injury. As it is limited to pain conditions the amendment retains a desirable 
flexibility and would not affect, for example, the classification of pregnancy 
as a physical injury. While the number of primary CPS claims taken to court 
has rapidly reduced since Teen, they have not disappeared entirely.137 The 
utility of this amendment is therefore to clarify the existing position, ensure 
consistency in its application and limit the potential for futile but costly 
appeals to be made. 
Given the low chance that a Judge would adopt the Allenby precedent as 
justification for classing CPS as a physical injury, a legislative definition to 
prevent this is not essential. The second proposed legislative change should 
                                                            
135 Department of Labour, above n 125, at [34]. 
136 New Zealand Law Society "Supplementary Submission to the Transport and Industrial 
Relations Select Committee on the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation 
Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008" at [4]. 
137 See for example Mitchell v Accident Compensation Corporation [2011] NZACC 247.  
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nonetheless be enacted as it usefully clarifies the law without wider 
implications for ACC entitlement.   
VI Conclusion 
New Zealanders would ultimately be best served by the enactment of a fully 
comprehensive compensation scheme which covers incapacity due to both 
accident and illness. However, this expansion must be made by Parliament 
and not in an ad hoc manner through the courts. Judicial interpretation of 
the Accident Compensation Act should instead reflect the reality that 
entitlement under the present scheme is tightly circumscribed. Thus, while 
the recent decision in Allenby provides an opportunity to reconsider whether 
CPS constitutes a physical injury, the status quo should be maintained. The 
existing position best upholds the integrity of the current legislation and 
clearly marks the boundaries of the scheme. Although possible, it is unlikely 
that the courts would use the Allenby reasoning to classify CPS a physical 
injury; nonetheless the recommended amendment would bring welcome 
clarity to this area of the law and should accordingly be enacted. 
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